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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant seeks to overturn the lower court's 
decision and have judgment entered in his favor. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
After a trial on the merits the court granted judgment 
stating that plaintiff was entitled to contribution from the 
Estate of William J. Ercanbrack, deceased, for all monies paid 
by plaintiff on a contract and denied relief to appellant on its 
counterclaim asking for judgment on a promissory note signed by 
plaintiff. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks to have the lower court's decision 
vacated, a decision entered in his favor, and for a money judgment 
on the counterclaim. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
(a) Plaintiff's Complaint- Statement of Facts. On or 
about September 2, 1965, plaintiff entered into an Installment 
Sale and Security Agreement for the purchase of a mobile home. 
(See Exhibit P-1). The agreement was in the name of and signed 
by the plaintiff. Also on the document was the signature of the 
deceased, William J. Ercanbrack. The deceased had signed in the 
lower left hand corner of the first page under a heading that 
stated "Buyer Acknowledges Receipt Of An Exact Copy Of This 
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Agreement." Plaintiff's witness testified that the deceased 
signed "to secure the note, to secure the agreement. " (T. T. at 
p. 5). Plaintiff's witness went on to state "as I recall, he 
(William J. Ercanbrack), stated that she (the plaintiff) had no 
credit, and that he (William J. Ercanbrack) would sign ... " 
Title to the mobile home was taken in the name of Naon Winkel, 
the plaintiff. (T.T. at p. 5). When the deceased signed the 
September 2, 1975, Installment Sale and Security Agreement, 
acknowledging along with plaintiff receipt of a copy of the same, 
it was understood and agreed that the mobile home was to be the 
plaintiff's property, no consideration flowed to him, and the 
deceased claimed no title or interest in the mobile home. 
Plaintiff claims full ownership to the same. Plaintiff acknowledges 
that Mr. Ercanbrack received "nothing under the terms of that 
contract to sell the trailer, that is, he obtained no right or 
interest" in the mobile home (See T.T. at p. 24 lines 7 to 11) 
The home was purchased solely for the benefit of Miss Winkel, 
the plaintiff. (Plaintiff's witness - T.T. at p. 59). 
Plaintiff took possession of the mobile home and the 
mobile home dealer, Mobile Mansions, assigned the Installment 
Sale and Security Agreement to Walker Bank & Trust Company with 
"full recourse" on or about September 6, 1975. 
Walker Bank & Trust Company brought action against 
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the plaintiff on the Installment Sale and Security Agreement 
because of plaintiff's failure to make the payments due 
thereunder and plaintiff is in this action attempting to obtain 
contribution. 
(b) Defendant's Counterclaim- Statement of Facts. 
On or about November 20, 1975, plaintiff, Naon Winkel, signed 
a promissory note in the amount of $6,273.00 made payable to 
the order of William J. Ercanbrack, which note fell due 
September 20, 1976. (See Exhibit D-18). Two days thereafter 
on November 22, 1975, the deceased, William J. Ercanbrack, wrote 
a letter to his attorney, J. Harold Call, dated November 22, 1975, 
requesting in the event of his death, that the note be treated 
as "uncollectible and to be wrote off of my 1976 income as a loss." 
(See Exhibit D-20). William J. Ercanbrack died on the 26th day 
of October, 1976, without the note having been paid. 
I 
WILLIAM J. ERCANBRACK, DECEASED, WAS MERELY AN 
ACCOMMODATION MAKER AND THUS THE PLAINTIFF IS NOT ENTITLED TO 
CONTRIBUTION. 
Although William J. Ercanbrack might be held responsible 
to the holder of the Installment Sale and Security Agreement in 
event the b'.lyer and owner of the mobile home, Naon Winkel, failed 
to pay, because of his signature appearing on the contract 
indicating that he had "acknowledged receipt of an exact copy of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
the agreement," the facts clearly show that if he signed as a 
promissor, it was for the accommodation and as a surety for the 
plaintiff (T.T. at p. 5 p. 24 and p. 59). Under the facts of 
the case he would only be secondarily liable, the plaintiff 
being primarily liable. 
It must be borne in mind that Mr. Ercanbrack received 
no consideration for the contract (T.T. at p. 24 lines 7-ll). 
The motive which prompts one to enter into a contract and the 
consideration for the contract are distinct and different. 
Williston, Contracts 3rd Edition Section 111. Parties are led 
into agreements by many inducements, such as the hope of profit, 
the expectation of acquiring what they could not otherwise 
obtain, the desire of avoiding a loss, etc. These inducements 
are not, however, either legal or equitable consideration, and 
actually compose no part of the contract. Hunter vs Golf Proof 
Production Company, 220 sw 163. See Restatement, Contracts 
Section 84. 
Prior to and under the NIL an accommodation party is 
one who has signed the instrument as maker, drawer, acceptor, 
or endorser, without receiving value therefore, and for the 
purpose of lending his name to some person. '~ithout receiving 
value," means without receiving value for the instrument, and 
not without receiving any consideration for lending one's name. 
See Carr vs Wainwright, 43 Federal 2d 507, 508; Morris County 
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Brick Company vs Austin, 75 A 550. 
Under the Commercial Code the essential characteristic 
of an accommodation party is that the accommodation party is a 
surety and even the absence of consideration is not a requisite. 
Thus, under the Commercial Code defendant would not even need 
to show that William J. Ercanbrack signed gratuitously. He may 
have been a paid surety or received other compensation from 
Miss Winkel, the party accommodated. The Commercial Code provides 
that an accommodation party is one who signs the instrument in 
any capacity for the purpose of lending his name to another party. 
See Section 70A-3-415 U.C.A. 
An "accommodated party" is the one for whose conven.i ence 
the paper is made, the one for whose benefit the accommodation 
party signs, or the one to whom the name or credit of another 
person - the accommodating party - is loaned. 
Under law the accommodation party is liable on the 
instrument, this liability attaches in regard to parties other 
than the accommodated party, but not in regard to the accommodated 
party for whom the accommodation party is a surety. 
It is well recognized that an accommodation party has 
a right to subrogation. When an accommodation party has paid an 
instrument some courts maintain he may sue thereon on the has~s 
that he is subrogated to the rights of the creditor and others 
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hold that he has the right to sue on the implied promise of 
indemnity. Under either theory a principal would be barred 
from asking for contribution from the accommodating party. 
Thus, the only issue is whether or not William J. 
Ercanbrack was an accommodation maker. The evidence is clear 
that he was, he received nothing "for the instrument," and he 
is not liable to the plaintiff, the party he accommodated. 
Utah's Uniform Commercial Code prevents the plaintiff 
from recovering against the estate of the deceased. 
Section 70A-3-415 U.C.A. 
"Contract of accommodation party. -
(1) A~ accommodation party is one who 
signs the instrument in any capacity 
for the purpose of lending his name 
to another party to it ••. 
(5) An accommodation party is not 
liable to the party accommodated, and 
if he pays the instrument has a right 
of recourse on the instrument against 
such party. " 
II 
THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERING EVIDENCE THAT WAS 
INADMISSIBLE BECAUSE OF THE DEAD MAN STATUTE. 
Section 78-24-2 clearly states that Miss Winkel, the 
plaintiff, cannot testify as to any conversation or transaction 
which she had with William J. Ercanbrack, the deceased. 
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This section of the code commonly referred to as 
the dead man statute reads as follows: 
'~ho may not be witnesses. - the following 
persons cannot be witnesses: 
(3) A party to any civil action ... and 
any person directly interested in the 
event thereof •.. when the adverse party 
in such action ... defends, ... as the 
executor .•. of any deceased person ... 
as to any statement, or transaction with, 
such deceased ..• or a matter of fact 
whatever, which must have been equally 
within the knowledge of both the witness 
and such ••. deceased person ...• " 
The trial court erred in allowing the plaintiff to 
testify concerning transactions with the deceased which were 
calculated to take him out of the status of an ~ccommodation 
maker. 
The transcript shows that the plaintiff tried to defraud 
the estate by alleging that the June l, 1976, promissory note 
signed by the deceased was due and payable and that no payments 
had been made against the same. 
This attempt was evidenced by her "under oath" creditor' 
claim for $1600.00. See defendant's Exhibit D-19. It wasn't 
until her deposition was taken and she was confronted with certair 
cancelled checks that she admitted that nearly half of the claim 
had previously been paid. (T.T. at p. 90 and p. 91) 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
Defendant claims there is good cause and a need for 
strictly enforcing the dead man statute in this particular case 
because of Miss Winkel's previous attempts to obtain at the 
expense of the minors and other children money that she was not 
entitled to. 
III 
THE PURPORTED CODICIL DID NOT CONTAIN LANGUAGE 
THAT CONCELLED THE INDEBTEDNESS PLAINTIFF OWED THE DECEASED. 
The letter of November 22, 1975, provides that the 
November 20, 1975, promissory note signed by Naon Winkel in 
the amount of $6,273.00 was to be treated "as an uncollectible 
item and to be wrote off of my 1976 income as a loss." 
The deceased did not cancel the indebtedness. His 
language does not indicate he intended to make her a gift, but 
he merely wanted the obligation treated as a bad debt. A bad 
debt or uncollectible obligation can be written off as a loss on 
an income tax return. However, a gift or gratuitous cancellation 
of a debt could not be treated as tax deductible item on an 
income tax return. If we treat the language as making a gift, 
we would defeat the clear intent spelled out in the letter or 
codicil - he would not be able to treat it as a loss on his 
income tax return. 
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Under the circumstances, because of the financial 
condition of the plaintiff, Naon Winkel, the deceased was aware 
of the fact that the expense and effort of legal action to 
collect the obligation would be unfeasible - thus his instructions 
to treat it as an uncollectible item and write if off as a bad 
debt. However, these practical instructions to J. Harold Call, 
deceased's attorney, do not require him to ignore the obligation 
or prevent him from using the same as an offset against any claim 
that the plaintiff might file against the estate. 
It appears to appellant that the court erred in denying 
defendant's counterclaim, in refusing to allow the executor to 
use the indebtedness owed by the plaintiff to the deceased as an 
offset against the claims Miss Winkle filed against the estate,and 
in rendering a decision that prevents J. Harold Call from treating 
the item as a bad debt for income tax purposes. The decision 
defeats and puts at naught the language used by the deceased who 
said to treat the note "as an uncollectible i tern and to be wrote 
off of my 1976 income as a loss," for if the court legally declares 
it a gift it would not qualify as a "deductible bad debt." 
CONCLUSIONS 
Pursuant to Section ?OA-3-415 the defendant "is not 
liable to the party accommodated, " Naon Winkel, on any payments 
she has or shall hereafter make on the Installment Sale and 
Security Agreement; plaintiff is not entitled to contribution 
because the deceased, William J. Ercanbrack, was an accommodation 
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party under Section 70A-3-415 U.C.A. The defendant should be 
entitled to judgment against the plaintiff in the amount of 
$6,273.00 on the November 20, 1975, promissory note or at least 
have the right to claim the indebtedness as an offset against 
the amount that the court found owed plaintiff on the June l, 
1976, promissory note. 
Respectfully submitted, 
t llant 
30 orth Main 
Heber City, Utah 84032 
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